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6. Concluding remarks
In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that 
phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, 
but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that 
phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices 
and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I
also identify questions and issues relevant to the assessment of phenomenal conservatism to be 
investigated in further research.
Phenomenal conservatism is the internalist theory of immediate, non-inferential justification 
based on the principle (PC), stating that if a subject S has a seeming that P, in the absence of defeaters, 
S thereby has justification for believing P. Throughout this work I have assumed the soundness 
intuitions and arguments that attest that epistemic justification is internalist. Once epistemic internalism
is adopted, (PC) appears plausible: if S has a seeming that P and no reason to distrust it, the only 
epistemically justified attitude for S to take towards P is –– intuitively –– belief. Phenomenal 
conservatism has been celebrated for having an array of epistemological merits. The following are 
possibly the most significant. Phenomenal conservatism supplies ordinary cognitive practices with a 
rational explanation. Indeed, in everyday life we seem to take ourselves to have justification for 
entertaining many beliefs just because of how things appear to us to be, in accordance with (PC). 
Moreover, phenomenal conservatism is claimed to form the basis of fallible foundationalism. For it 
looks plausible that it is our appearances that put an end to the regress of inferentially-justified beliefs, 
when we search for an ultimate justification of our beliefs. Finally, phenomenal conservatism is said to 
help us overcome scepticism. For if (PC) is true, we can get many beliefs justified on the basis of our 
appearances even if we lack independent reasons to rule out any sceptical conjecture. Since 
phenomenal conservatism looks plausible and promising of a variety of epistemological benefits, it is 
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important to investigate whether it actually keeps its promises and withstands apparently forceful 
objections raised against it. In this book I have carried out such an investigation to some extent.  
In §3 I have scrutinized a number of views opposing phenomenal conservatism which entail 
that cognitively penetrated appearances would in many cases lack the power to justify their 
propositional contents even prima facie. I have rejected all these views as implausible, incoherent or 
counterintuitive. I have suggested that (undetectable) cognitively penetrated appearances wouldn’t lose 
their inherent justifying power, and that the intuitions that seem to indicate otherwise confound the 
property of being a belief produced by a faculty that doesn’t function properly with the property of 
being an unjustified belief. In §4 I have refuted an apparently forceful case made to discredit (PC), 
according to which (PC) is incompatible with Bayesian methodology. I have shown that the conclusion 
that (PC) conflicts with Bayesianism follows from a specious formalization of the intuitive notion of 
seeming-based justification. In §§4 and 5 I have found seeming-based justification to be elusive: when 
S becomes reflectively aware of a seeming that P, S loses the justification for P based on the seeming. 
For S’s justification based on S’s reflective belief that she has that seeming overrides S’s seeming-based
justification. In §5, I have shown that since seeming-based justification is elusive in this way, (PC) is 
unaffected by easy justification problems.
Although the above difficulties raised against phenomenal conservatism have turned out to be 
insubstantial, in §5 I have shown that the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive limits the 
antisceptical efficacy of (PC). When S engages with an argument questioning her own having 
immediate justification, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t give S the means to rebut that argument. The
contribution of phenomenal conservatism to the fight against scepticism is thus more modest than 
expected. Alternative responses to the sceptic –– for instance, abductive and hinge-proposition replies1 
–– don’t seem to be subject to limitations of this sort. When S engages with an argument questioning 
her own having justification of the relevant type, these responses –– if working at all –– do enable S to 
rebut the argument. It is worth noticing, nevertheless, that the elusiveness of seeming-based 
1 For critical surveys of recent responses see for instance Greco (2007), Klein (2019) and Pritchard (2019).
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justification curbs but doesn’t obliterate the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism. Thanks to 
(PC), individuals who don’t reflect on their seemings can still gain seeming-based justification for their 
beliefs even if they have no independent justification for ruling out sceptical conjectures. These 
subjects are presumably the large majority. We can draw similar conclusions about the asserted 
capacity of phenomenal conservatism to provide ordinary epistemic practices with a rationale: 
phenomenal conservatism can account for quotidian justification of unreflective individuals, but it 
cannot account for the justification of subjects who reflect on their appearances (think for instance of 
microscopists, birdwatchers, pilots, witnesses in courts of law and epistemologists). These 
considerations suggest that phenomenal conservatism would provide a more forceful response to the 
sceptic and a more comprehensive account of ordinary cognitive practices –– inclusive of those proper 
to reflective individuals –– if it were integrated with a theory of reflective –– and so inferential –– 
justification. What theory would be suitable for this role and how phenomenal conservatism could 
actually be integrated with it are questions to be thoroughly investigated.
Further work on phenomenal conservatism should address other issues that I have not explored 
in this short monograph. To begin with, my response to the Bayesian objection calls for further 
investigation: an important question is whether there is an adequate formal model of the notion of 
seeming-based justification that does justice to (PC).2 The existence of such a formalisation would 
bring further support to phenomenal conservatism. Let’s turn to a last issue. The fact that seeming-
based justification is elusive doesn’t prevent appearances from being sources of non-inferential 
justification. Thus, this fact doesn’t undermine the role of (PC) as a key principle of fallible 
foundationalism. Indeed, (PC) has been claimed to be the sole key principle of fallible foundationalism;
that is to say, one capable of accounting for all kinds of non-inferential justification –– inclusive of, for 
instance, perceptual, introspective, rational and mnemonic justification (cf. Huemer 1999, 2001). These
global ambitions of (PC), however, have been called into question (see Smithies 2019). The present 
work has mainly focused on perceptual justification. Future work on phenomenal conservatism should 
2 An interesting attempt is in Miller (2016). 
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carry out a systematic investigation about which forms of non-inferential justification can actually be 
accounted by (PC).
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